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upon the interpretation of Communist literature, judicial
notice of Communist Party principles, or the imputation of
Communist Party principles to a party member, it is of
doubtful validity. While prior decisions support these
grounds, the more recent and better reasoned cases reject
them.27 Finally the holding that the refusal to take an oath
to bear arms is a ground for denying citizenship to one who
is not a conscientious objector is in accord with the Congres-
sional policy of exempting conscientious objectors from the
duty of bearing arms and does not conflict with the policy
of admitting such conscientious objectors to citizenship with-
out the oath to bear arms.
TORTS
EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY IN HIRING PHYSICALLY
UNFIT EMPLOYEE
An employee sued his employer in tort1 for personal
injuries caused when the employee's serious heart disease
was aggravated by hard manual labor. The complaint alleged
that the employer required a physical examination at the time
of hiring, which disclosed the heart ailment; but that the
employee was unaware of the disease and the employer did
not inform him of it although the employer knew that strenu-
ous labor would be likely to cause harm. It was further al-
leged that the employer had breached two duties: that of re-
fraining from assigning the employee hard manual labor,
and that of informing him of his infirmity. The trial court
gave judgment for the employee. On appeal, the Supreme
Court of Maine reversed, holding the complaint defective in
27. Recent cases rejecting these grounds are: Schneiderman v. U.S.,
320 U.S. 118 (1942); Strecker v. Kessler, 95 F.2d 976 (C.C.A. 5th
1938); Ex parte Fierstein, 41 F.2d 53 (C.C.A. 9th 1930); Com-
munist Party v. Peek, 20 Cal.2d 536, 127 P.2d 889 (1942); State
v. Reeves, 5 Wash. 2d 637, 106 P.2d 729 (1940).
1. The employee in the principal case did not bring his action under
the Maine Workmen's Compensation Act because that Act provides
for recovery against employers only when the injury was caused
by an "accident." Ale. Rev. Stat. (1944) c. 26, §8. Here the heart
injury resulted gradually from the work and did not result directly
from a sudden strain. Cf. Coiner's Case, 130 Me. 373, 156 Atl.
516 (1931), where a pre-existing heart ailment, aggravated by a
sudden strain, was held to be "accidental" within the meaning of
the Maine statute. See also Brown's Case, 123 Me. 424, 1L23 AtI.
421 (1924): "Sudden heart dilatation caused by a strain would be
we think in ordinary parlance called accidental."
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absence of an allegation that the employer knew or should
have known that the employee did not know of his own heart
ailment. Glidden v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 54 A.2d 528
(Maine 1947).
Few cases have considered whether an employee may re-
cover in tort from his employer for injuries resulting prima-
rily from physical unfitness of the employee for the work
undertaken. Where it has been sought to impose liability
on the employer, the cases have been argued on the theory
that the employer's duty is based solely on his knowledge of
the employee's infirmity and the likelihood of injury from
certain types of work. The instant case presents an inter-
esting aspect of this problem in that the employer's knowl-
edge was acquired through a pre-hiring physical examination.
The substance of the holding is that an employer owes no duty
to warn nor to refrain from hiring for hard manual labor
an employee whom the employer knows to be in poor phys-
ical condition, unless the employer also knows that the em-
ployee is unaware of his own ailment. The court, in finding
essential this knowledge on the part of the employer, rested
its decision upon a presumption that an employee "is almost
always aware of his unfitness. ' 2 If there is a basis for the
presumption, it follows that the employer may reasonably as-
sume that the employee has chosen what degree of care is
commensurate for his own protection." The presumption in-
voked by the court was created by an early Massachusetts
case.4
2. Instant case at 532.
3. If the presumption is to apply, it may serve to bring the case
within a well known principle that "the mere relation of master
and servant can never imply an obligation upon the part of the
master to take more care of the servant than he may reasonably
be expected to take of himself." Wood v. William Kane Mfg. Co.,
257 Pa. 13, 101 Ati. 73, 74 (1917). But more likely it would serve
to bring the case within the scope of the doctrine of assumption of
risk. And in this sense the employee would have been presumed
to have contemplated the risk of injury as an incident of his em-
ployment. The principle stated broadly is that "While the various
kinds of risks often shade one into the other, we may state gen-
erally that a servant assumes (1) such dangers as are ordinarily
and normally incident to his occupation, and as a workman of
mature years is presumed to know them whether he does or not."
Boatman v. Miles, 27 Wyo. 481, 199 Pac. 933, 935 (1921). And by
its nature "The rationalization of voluntary assumption of risk
in this sense is that it negatives the existence of a duty on the part
of the defendant and establishes his freedom from negligence."
Harper, "Torts" §130 (1933).
4. Crowley v. Appleton, 148 Mass. 98, 18 N.E. 675 (1888). Labatt,
344 [Vol. 23
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It may be argued that as to certain types of internal
physical defects, the average wage earner is almost always
unaware of his unfitness. This would be true, for example,
of defects which only a physician's examination will disclose.
When a pre-hiring physical examination required by the em-
ployer discloses a defect of this type, it seems more reasonable
that the employer should have the duty of informing the em-
ployee of his condition. Such a duty may be simply dis-
charged, and would place no serious burden upon the em-
ployer.
In analogous cases, courts have given employers the duty
of informing employees that if they continue in their employ-
ment they are likely to suffer impaired health. Courts have
labeled the diseases which frequently result from certain
types of employment as "occupational diseases." Examples
are lead poisoning resulting from exposure to paints ;5 injuries
in 3 Labatt, "Master and Servant" §1082 (2d ed. 1913), first
voiced the presumption utilized by the court in the instant case
based upon the reasoning of the Crowley case. The presumption
was followed in Tenn. Coal, Iron and R. Co. v. Moody, 192 Ala. 364,
68 So. 274 (1915). One court has expressly repudiated the belief
that it is necessary that the employer know of the employee's ig-
norance of his own physical condition. It stated that "the master's
liability is measured by his own knowledge of the actual facts, and
not by his knowledge of the servant's ignorance of the facts."
Hamilton v. Standard Oil Co., 323 Mo. 531, 546, 19 S.W.2d 679,
683 (1929). While this would appear to be a correct statement
of the basis of the employer's duty when the presumption is not
applied, the reasoning by which the Missouri court reached its
result is open to question. Since in that state the employee was
not required to prove freedom from contributory negligence, he did
not have to show that he was ignorant of his physical unfitness.
Therefore, the court held that he need not prove that his employer
knew of this fact. Requiring the employee to do so, the court
thought, would be placing the burden of proof of a fact upon the
employee which he was not obligated to prove. It should be noted
that in the instant case, the law of Maine puts the burden of
proving freedom from contributory negligence in a personal injury
suit upon the plaintiff. Rouse v. Scott, 132 Me. 22, 23, 164 Atl. 872,
873 (1933); Field v. Webber, 132 Me. 236, 241, 169 Ati. 732, 735(1933). However, the court in the instant case did not rest its
decision upon that ground, and to do so would be to indulge in
circuitous reasoning. If the presumption that employee is almost
always aware of his unfitness is applied, then a showing that the
employer knew that the employee was ignorant of his unfitness is
necessary to rebut the presumption and to create a duty in the
employer to guard the employee from harm. It certainly follows
that if the presumption is not indulged in, the required showing is
unnecessary. This is so not because of the doctrine of contributory
negligence, but simply because in such a view of the case it is
not essential in establishing the employer's duty.




caused by breathing impure air while working in mines ;' and
silicosis acquired while employed in dusty atmospheres, such
as in the manufacture of porcelain fixtures7 Courts have
placed upon employers engaged in industries which create
risks of "occupational diseases" the duty of warning their
employees of the conditions of employment which are likely
to engender diseases.8
Injuries from employment usually result from the effect
of many factors, including the dangerous character of the
woirk and the physical frailties of the workers. Theoretically,
a physically perfect worker could acquire no disease as the
result of working under perfect working conditions which
create no risk of disease. But practically, neither workers
nor working conditions are ever perfect. It is manifest that
the healthiest worker may acquire an "occupational disease";
and, conversely, if an employee is in sufficiently impaired
physical condition when he begins work, his condition may be
aggravated by hard manual labor which his physical superior
could perform without harm. In the first type case---"occu-
pational diseases"-the courts have placed the risk of injury
upon the employer.. But as illustrated by the principal case,
in the second type it is upon the employee. In the first, the
employee may recover when heproves that his employer fail-
ed to warn him of danger from an "occupational disease" of
which the employer was in a position to have greater knowl-
edge than the employee. Here, the basis of the duty is the
employer's own greater knowledge of the primary source of
the danger, i.e., the unwholesome working conditions.9 The
employee, therefore, need not also prove that the employer
knew or should have known that the employee was unaware
of the danger from "occupational disease." However, in
order to recover for injuries resulting primarily from ag-
gravation of a physical ailment which existed when work was
begun, the employee must allege and prove not only that the
employer knew of his infirmity because of a physical exam-
6. Jellico Coal Co. v. Adkins, 197 Ky. 684, 247 S.W. 972 (1923).
7. Jacque v. Locke Insulator Corp., 70 F.2d 680 (C.C.A. 2d 1934),
cert. denied, 293 U.S. 585 (1934).
8. Cases collected in 105 A.L.R. 80 (1936).
9. Penn. Pulverizing Co. v. Butler, 61 F.2d 311 (C.C.A. 3d 1932);
Stevens & Sons Co. v. Daigneault, 4 F.2d 53 (C.C.A. 1st 1925);
O'Keefe v. National Folding Box Co., 66 Conn. 38, 33 Atl. 587




ination given at the time of hiring, and did not warn the em-
ployee of it, but also that the employer knew or should have
known that the employee was unaware of his own infirmity. 0
Of course, the differentiation hi the cases arises from the
application of the presumption that the employee "is almost
always aware of his own unfitness."
By what kind of proof can the employee overcome the
presumption? It would appear that circumstantial evidence
would be sufficient.1 Thus, where the employee has submit-
ted a written application on which he stated his belief that
he was free from infirmities of the nature disclosed by the
examination, it would form the basis of an inference that the
employer had knowledge of the applicant's ignorance of his
infirmities. And the same would be true where the employee
has indicated orally to his employer that he believes himself
free from such infirmities. But in many cases where neither
a written nor oral assertion by the employee can be proved,
the effect of the presumption might be to deny the employee
recovery for his injuries.
Numerous reasons have been assigned as a justification
for a court's indulging in presumptions.12 The basis, if any,
for the presumption that an employee "is almost always aware
of his unfitness," must be the common experience of mankind.
It is submitted that the presumption, if there must be a pre-
sumption, should be limited to its logical core and should be
10. Thus, in both instances the employer has a greater knowledge of
the primary source of danger. In the occupational disease cases,
courts presume that the employer's position is one of greater
knowledge, and consequently the employer must rebut that pre-
sumption if he will successfully justify his failure to warn. How-
ever, in the cases of which the principal case is an example, courts
presume that the employee's position is the one of greater knowl-
edge, and the employee is required to overcome that presumption
by proof that the employer knew or should have known that the
employee had no knowledge of his own infirmity.
11. See the instruction given by the trial' court to the jury, and not
disturbed by the reviewing court on appeal, in Crowley v. Appleton,
148 Mass. 98, 18 N.E. 675 (1888).
12. In an analytical discussion of presumptions, Professor Morgan
states that courts and writers agree that a presumption is invoked
"because it is believed to be justified on logical grounds by human
experience, or because it accomplishes a procedural convenience,
or because it furthers a result deemed to be socially desirable, or be-
cause of a combination of two or more of these reasons." He
reaches the conclusion that "the oft-repeated formulae of the
courts respecting presumptions should be scrapped, and presump-
tions should be classified according to the reasons which justify
their creation and existence." Morgan, "Some Observations Con-
cerning Presumptions" 44 Harv. L. Rev. 906, 931 (1931).
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rephrased: an employee is almost always aware of those
physical defects which are externally apparent, or which
though not externally apparent otherwise manifest their
presence by impairment of function to such an extent that a
reasonably prudent employee would be aware of their exist-
ence. Thus, when the applicant has a goiter or hernia exter-
nally apparent, it would be reasonable for the employer to as-
sume that the applicant is aware of the defect. But courts
disregard the facts of life when, as in the principal case, they
mechanically apply the presumption and conclude that em-
ployees are presumed to know all of their physical defects-
even those which are not externally or functionally apparent,
and which only a medical examination can disclose.
When an employer, in addition to his failure to warn
his employee of physical defects disclosed by an examination,
also takes certain affirmative steps to induce the employee to
work, liability for the subsequently aggravated defects has
been placed upon the employer. For instance, an employer
may become liable where he threatens the employee with dis-
charge for failing to perform heavy manual labor.13 Also, the
employer may be liable for "assuring" the employee that he is
capable of performing it without injury1" Similarly, where
the employer requires the employee to submit to medical care
when injured at work, the employer is liable for improper
diagnosis resulting in subsequent injuries.15 It is submitted
that the cases in this group furnish an analogy upon which
the court in the principal case might have reached a different
13. Blue Bell Globe Mfg. Co. v. Lewis, 27 So.2d 900 (Miss. 1946).
14. Hamilton v. Standard Oil Co., 323 Mo. 531, 19 S.W.2d 679 (1929).
Although the courts which have imposed liability for "assurances"
have not been explicit on what grounds they do so, elements of the
tort of deceit can be found lurking in the background and influen-
cing the decisions. It is true that when relationship between par-
ties is of such a character that the law imposes a duty to speak,
silence may amount to a misrepresentation. Harper, "Torts" §219
(1933). However, it seems more likely that what the cases mean
by "assurances" is that the employer is guilty of negligent use
of language, resulting in a misrepresentation of the true condi-
tions of the employment. Harper, "Torts" §76 (1933). A mis-
representation of this sort by the employer is active negligence,
i.e., the creation of an unreasonable risk to the employee for
which ,the employer making the misrepresentation will be held
liable. Although it might be harsh to impute to the employer an
intent to deceive the employee, it does not appear unreasonable
to hold the employer negligent in not correcting the employee's
misconception of the true facts of the situation when that mis-
conception was created by the employer's conduct.
15. Knox v. Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp., 158 F.2d 973 (C.C.A. 5th 1947).
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result. For when a required physical examination at the time
of hiring discloses serious physical defects not externally ap-
parent, and the employer nevertheless hires the applicant
without warning him of the defects, the employer might be
held impliedly to have represented that the employee is phy-
sically capable of performing the work. The act of hiring,
immediately following the examination, is a representation
by conduct which speaks as loud as words of assurance.
It is likely that certain policy considerations moved the
court in the principal case. While some of these consider-
ations are persuasive of judicial refusal to impose upon em-
ployers the duty to refrain from hiring, they are not equally
persuasive of judicial refusal to impose upon employers a
duty to warn. As a practical matter, it would be difficult
for an employer to undertake in each case to determine the
nature and extent of the applicant's infirmity, or the likeli-
hood of injury which would result from it. Further, such
imposition of responsibility upon the employer would not
be desirable, even from the employee's point of view, since
it would result in depriving of a livelihood many afflicted
persons who have no choice but to labor.", These policy
considerations urge against imposing upon the employer the
duty to refrain from hiring an applicant known by the em-
ployer to be suffering from a disease which might be aggrav-
ated by the work undertaken. But such policy considerations
do not negative the desirability of imposing on the employer
a legal duty to inform the applicant of his infirmity, thereby
permitting the applicant himself to make the choice of whe-
ther or not he will risk aggravating his condition by under-
taking the work.17
16. Tenn. Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Moody, 192 Ala. 364, 68 So. 274 (1915).
17. Cf. Thompson v. United Laboratories, 221 Mass. 276, 108 N.E. 1042(1915), where the court stated that the purpose of giving warning
to an employee is not merely to enable him to work in safety, but
is also to enable him to determine whether he should abandon the
employment. It should be remembered that imposition upon the
employer of a duty to warn his employee of physical defects un-
known to the latter may be simply and easily discharged. For
resumably if the employer warns the employee, then the employee,
aving equal knowledge of his physical unfitness, can be taken to
have assumed the risk of injury from hard manual labor. In an
occupational disease case where the employer warned the employee
of the likelihood of his contracting a disease, the employee was held
to have assumed ths risk of disease when in fact he became af-
flicted with it. Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Robinette, 257 Ky. 558,
78 S.W.2d 802 (1935).
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